Since it first developed, the law of war has focused on protecting human beings. It prioritises human protection by controlling the conduct of belligerents in order to minimise human injuries and casualties. However, the consequences of war are seldom limited to human casualties. War also causes major destruction to the environment. This article shows that despite prioritising human protection, international law provides a significant number of rules to protect the environment during armed conflicts. Contrary to claims that existing rules are insufficient, the law of war adequately safeguards the environment during armed conflicts by prohibiting certain military activities that may cause significant damage to the environment. Furthermore, there are peacetime regulations that may continue to bind belligerents in times of war.
armed conflicts by prohibiting certain military activities that may cause significant damage to the environment. Furthermore, there are peacetime regulations that may continue to bind belligerents in times of war. These peacetime obligations significantly strengthen the legal protection given to the environment during armed conflicts.
7 Relevant peacetime provisions may be found in international human rights law, international environmental law and international law of the use of force (ius ad bellum).
In identifying the relevant legal rules, this article draws on international conventions (treaty law) and international custom (customary international law), as well as making reference to general principles of law, judicial decisions and eminent literature as additional sources of law. 8 This article firstly examines states' obligations under international humanitarian law (IHL) and then analyses peacetime obligations. It shows clearly that existing legal obligations that protect the environment during wartime are adequate, and thus that belligerent states can potentially be held liable if these rules are violated.
ii. does international humanitarian law (the law of war) Provide sufficient Rules to Protect the Environment?
Some commentators divide environmental protection within the law of war into two categories: direct and indirect protection. Such a distinction is based on the intention of the drafters or the ratio behind the specific rule: those that were specifically intended to protect the environment; and those that were not intended to do so, but may nevertheless be favourable to environmental protection. 9 Nevertheless, both of these categories are equally important for the purposes of this thesis because they have the same effect: protecting the environment during armed conflict (although this may be to a greater or lesser degree in the individual case). Examining all rules within the law of war that protect the environment during armed conflicts, whether directly or indirectly, is necessary in order to demonstrate that international law provides sufficient legal protection for the environment in wartime.
a. treaty law
There are a number of treaty provisions within the law of war that address environmental protection in times of armed conflict. usses those provisions separately and chronologically, and shows that awareness of the need to specifically protect the environment in times of war arose in the 1970s, as part of the worldwide environmental movement. In addition, it will be shown that the environment during wartime may be protected simply as an adjunct to protecting people and their property or can be protected in its own right or due to its own inherent value.
The 1907 Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 11
This treaty protects the environment during armed conflict through art 23(g), which proscribes acts that 'destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war', 12 and art 55, which obliges occupying powers to 'safeguard the capital' of 'properties (real estate, forests and agricultural estates), and administer them in accordance with the rules of usufruct'. 13 Although mainly intended to safeguard human survival, art 23(g)'s reference to human 'property' potentially includes the environment.
14 Thus, some scholars consider that this article provides protection for the environment in terms of natural resources that are state property, such as oil stations or refineries that may become military targets of a war.
15 Furthermore, art 55 explicitly mentions that forests and agricultural estates are to be protected because of their indispensable value in supporting human life. This obligation was applied after the Second World War to hold German industrialists accountable for over-exploiting Polish forests for timber during the period of occupancy. 16 While it is true that art 23(g) provides an escape clause for military necessity, the provision as a whole gives notice to warring parties to take into account environmental factors during hostilities. Even though it was created without specific consideration of the environment, this provision has been argued by a commentator to offer protection in situations of 'extreme acts of environmental degradation'. nd the use of poison gas has been frequently 'condemned as a violation of international law'. 29 This is likely because the implementation of the Protocol has not been solely based on a relatively altruistic recognition of these weapons' inherently devastating effects, but on reciprocity. That is, states observe the Protocol, to a significant degree, out of the fear that otherwise these weapons would be used more readily against them. 30 But rather than undermining the Protocol's effectiveness, as a matter of state practice, this reciprocity basis has enhanced the effective implementation of this Protocol. 31 Third, the Protocol has been successfully argued to apply in real-life cases.For example, the use of herbicides and defoliants by the US during the Vietnam War, and Iraq's action of spilling and burning huge amounts of oil to produce black fumes during the Gulf War, have been seen as violations of the Protocol. A few years after the end of World War II in 1949, states successfully codified almost all of the rules and customs of warfare into four main conventions. 34 One of these, the Fourth Convention, provides environmental protection during armed conflict. Although the Convention's principal protection is for civilian persons, there are two provisions that protect the environment as the property of individual persons. Articles 53 and 147 state, respectively, that: 35 [a]ny destruction by the occupying power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the state, or to other public authorities, or to social or co-operative organisations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.
[g]rave breaches, to which the preceding Article relates, shall be those involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the present Convention: ... extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.
Article 53 closely mirrors art 55 of the Hague Regulations: 36 both protect 'property' during military occupation. Article 53 is wider in that it includes not only property owned by the state but also that owned by private entities. Still, both provisions protect only those properties within national territory and leave the areas in the commons outside a state's jurisdiction unprotected. 37 29 Schwabach, above n 15, at 124. 30 Espiell, above n 20, at 422. 31 Tarasofsky, above n 17, at 56. 32 Richard M. Whitaker "Environmental Aspects of Overseas Operations" (1995) 25(4) Army Law. 27, at 33; Schwabach, above n 15, at 124; Margaret T. Okorodudu-Fubara "Oil in the Persian Gulf War: Legal Appraisal of an Environmental Warfare" (1991) 38 This increases the level of environmental protection during military occupation, a period when destruction of the environment frequently occurs. 39 Article 147 enhances art 53's environmental protection by affirming as a breach of the Convention the unlawful and wanton destruction and appropriation of property in the absence of military necessity. Significantly, art 146 requires state parties to pass domestic legislation in order to prosecute those who commit or order action amounting to a grave breach. Further, states are required to prosecute such offenders before their courts regardless of their nationality. The Convention also authorises states to hand over offenders to other states subject to any extradition agreement existing between them. 40 This provision has heightened the deterrent effect on individuals involved in armed conflicts. 
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ENMOD generally proscribes the use of environmental modification techniques as weapons during armed conflict. The Convention also regulates the application of environmental modification technology for non-hostile purposes. It is accompanied by a document of 'Understandings', which contains written interpretations of arts I, II, III and VIII. 46 Although not binding, this document is recognised as being important and relevant in terms of the interpretation of specific terms in these articles.
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38 In art 53, destruction is permissible if it is rendered "absolutely necessary" by military necessity. Meanwhile, art 23(g) permits destruction if considered "imperatively demanded" by military necessity. Tarasofsky, above n 17, at 43. 39 47 These Understandings were not incorporated into the Convention but became part of the negotiating record and were included in the report transmitted by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to the UNGA in September 1976. Koppe, above n 9, at 128-129.
he Convention begins with art I's obligations on member states 'not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other state party' and not to 'assist, encourage or induce any state, group of states or international organisation to engage in activities contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article'. 48 Article II specifies that 'environmental modification techniques' includes "any technique for changing -through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes -the dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer space". 49 Article III allows environmental modification techniques to be used only for peaceful purposes and consistently with the general principles and applicable rules of international law. 50 The scope of arts I and II of ENMOD was challenged during the 1991 Gulf War after oil wells were burned and oil was spilled into the Persian Gulf by Iraqi forces. Some states were disappointed that these articles did not effectively cover these events. One of the reasons for this concern was articulated by Jordan, arguing that ENMOD contains "broad and vague" terms and impossible to enforce because it does not provide proper mechanismsfor the investigation and settlement of any dispute under the Convention. Therefore, as ENMOD "was revealed as being painfully inadequate during the Gulf conflict", Jordan proposed a revision of the existing laws protecting the environment during armed conflict through the UNGA.
51
States furtherdiscussed ENMOD's failure to apply during the Gulf War at ENMOD's Second Review Conference in 1992, which considered whether or not conventional technology measures, such as the use of herbicides and burning of oil wells, fall within the scope of art II. This conference declared the use of herbicides to be a method of war proscribed under arts I and II, but unfortunately said nothing about burning oil wells. 52 Nevertheless, this conclusion is an important confirmation that this Convention not only applies 48 ENMOD, above n 42, art I. 49 Ibid, art II.The "Understandings Regarding the Convention" provides a non-exhaustive list of the types of phenomena which may result from technology to modify the environment. These phenomena include: earthquakes and tsunamis; an upset in the ecological balance of a region; changes in weather patterns (clouds, precipitation, cyclones of various types and tornado storms); changes in climate patterns; changes in ocean currents; changes in the state of the ozone layer; and changes in the state of the ionosphere. ENMOD Understandings, above n 46, relating to art II. Even though these phenomena are listed, some of them are still considered to have a "high futuristic and science-fiction calibre" and may beyond the states' real capabilities. Koppe, above n 9, at 130; Dinstein, above n 2, at181.Indeed, the US and Soviet Union delegates admitted at the time ENMOD was negotiated that these techniques were only hypothetically possible. Koppe, ibid; ENMOD Understandings, above n 46, at [73] [74] . 50 to high technology, but also to low technology or conventional approaches.
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ENMOD prohibits environmental modification causing "widespread, long-lasting or severe" damage. Fortunately, clear definitions of these thresholds are expressly provided in the "Understandings". The term "widespread" may cover "an area on the scale of several hundred square kilometres"; "longlasting" includes "a period of months, or approximately a season"; and "severe" involves "serious or significant disruption or harm to human life, natural and economic resources or other assets".
54
The clear definitions provided in this Convention arguably may contribute to the interpretation of similar terms in other treaties such as the 1977 Additional Protocol I (see below at [2.1.5]).
Note that the damage thresholds in ENMOD are expressed as alternatives, rather than cumulative requirements as in the 1977 Additional Protocol I below. This means that to establish a violation of ENMOD Convention, it is enough if only one of the thresholds is met, whereas to breach the 1977 Additional Protocol I the damage must meet all three and be widespread, longterm and severe.
Article I of ENMOD further states that the damage or injury must be directed "to any other state party". Thus the application of this Convention is limited to state parties, regardless of whether that state is a warring or a neutral party. This approach was taken in order to encourage states to ratify this Convention and to prevent states from gaining benefit from it without becoming parties to it. 55 There remain, however, at least three kinds of damage which would fall outside the ambit of ENMOD: damage in the territory of a non-state party; 56 damage in the territory of the acting state; and damage beyond the jurisdiction of states in areas such as the high seas (unless the ships of a state party to ENMOD were affected). 59 provides provisions that specifically protect the environment during times of war. Articles 35(3) and 55 proffer significant legal protection to the environment by, for the first-time, expressly prohibiting the environment from being a specific military target. Unfortunately, as will be discussed, the Protocol is weakened by its failure to provide clear definitions of the relevant damage thresholds. Never- 53 Tarasofsky, above n 17, at 47. 54 there is also a belief that these provisions are difficult to apply to real cases because of their vague wording and high thresholds for damage assessment. 62 The 1977 Additional Protocol I does not provide clear guidance on the meaning of its damage thresholds: "widespread, long-term and severe". During the negotiation of the Protocol, only the "long-term" threshold was clarified as a period of at least ten years, 63 while the other two thresholds were left undefined. 64 The use of the conjunctive "and" in the phrase "widespread, long-term and severe" means that all three criteria must be met in order for the Protocol to apply. This is said to be why Iraqi and coalition forces cannot be held liable for environmental damage caused during the 1991 Gulf War. 65 Nevertheless, arts 35(3) and 55 signify a crucial development in the international law that protects the environment in times of hostilities. These provisions expressly protect the natural environment as an indispensable support to human health and survival. 66 Such explicit protection for the environmentis likely to clarify the scope of application during hostilities, more effectively protecting the environment. Article 55 sets a lower standard but offers wider protection than art 35(3) by imposing a positive duty of care for the environment during warfare 67 that involves states exercising due diligence by undertaking environmental impact assessments before launching military operations. 68 This obligation would be on-going and applicable both in offensive and defensive operations. 69 Furthermore, arts 35(3) and 55 do not provide any exception or condition of military necessity similar to that under art 23(g) of the 1907 Hague Regulations. In reference to the vague wording of the thresholds, one expert has however suggested that this problem may be overcome by interpreting the thresholds similarly to those employed in ENMOD. 70 Therefore, in addition to its express and specific prohibition against causing damage to the environment, arts 35(3) and 55 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I seem more reasonably applicable duringBesides arts 35(3) and 55, there are other provisions in the 1977 Additional Protocol I that may offer protection to the environment in indirect manner asthey are mainly intended to protect humans during war. These provisions are arts 51, 54(2), 56(1), 59 and 60.
Article 51 prohibits indiscriminate attacks including "those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol". 71 Further, art 51 considers an attack to be indiscriminate if it may be expected to cause "damage to civilian objects" that would be disproportionate to the actual and direct military advantage. 72 This article may be used in connection with the environment because indiscriminate attacks may result in unnecessary damage and will eventually threaten the environment. Damage to civilian objects may include damage to properties such as houses, farmlands and buildings where all of these represent the elements of the environment.
Article 54(2) prohibits actions intended to "attack, destroy, remove 65 Despite being acknowledged as widespread and severe, environmental damage inflicted by Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War has been doubted as reaching the level of "long-term", thus falling outside the application of Additional Protocol I. Al-Duaij, above n 61, at 106; Ines Peterson "The Natural Environment 70 Ibid, at 88-100. 71 The 1977 Additional Protocol I, above n 45, art 51(4)(c). 72 Ibid, art 51(5)(b).
r render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population". This provision expressly mentions "foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works" where these are in their natural form as part of the environment. 73 Article 56(1) prohibits any attack on works or installations "containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations" even if they are legitimate military targets if "such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population". 74 Other military targets located at or in the vicinity of these sites are entitled to the same protection. 75 The protection afforded by art 56(1) ceases to apply if the works are used "in regular, significant and direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support". The 1981 Convention's first reference to the environment is located in its preamble, by recalling the prohibition on employing "methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long- 73 Ibid, art 54(2). 74 Ibid, art 56(1). 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid, art 56(2). 77 Tarasofsky, above n 17, at 53. 78 The 1977 Additional Protocol I, above n 45, art 59. 79 85 According to art 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a preamble may play an important role in the interpretation of a treaty. 86 In addition, a convention's preamble commonly represents the motives of states parties and the underlying principles of the convention itself.
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The wording of the preamble to the 1981 Convention seems deliberately similar to art 35(3) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I. The decision to employ this wording by the drafter reflects the emergence of a customary law regarding the principle of environmental protection. 88 Unfortunately, the inclusion of this statement in the preamble has led to two major states, France and the US, attaching a reservation and a declaration respectively to the Convention on ratification. These clauses state that the preamble's first paragraph only binds those states that have subscribed to the 1977 Additional Protocol I.
89 Such a position is likely based on the fact that some major states persistently claim that arts 35(3) and 55(1) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I are not customary.
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The 1981 Convention's second important reference to the environment appears in art 2(4) of the Convention's Protocol III. It prohibits states from making "forests or other kinds of plant cover the object of attack by incendiary weapons except when such natural elements are used to cover, conceal or camouflage combatants or other military objectives, or are themselves military objectives".
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Given their references to environmental protection, these treaties offer clear and significant legal protection since armed conflicts that have occurred 84 Certain Conventional Weapons Convention, above n 81, Preamble. 85 Koppe, above n 9, at 187. The most recent treaty adopted by states providing for the protection of the environment during times of war is the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute). 93 This treaty established a permanent international criminal court with the main objective of prosecuting war criminals (individual military members or political leaders) for ordering or committing certain war crimes. The Court is therefore not concerned with state responsibility but is rather focused on individual criminal responsibility. Nevertheless, it counts crimes against the environment as war crimes and, in so doing, sends a strong message to military leaders to consider the environment during times of war or face criminal prosecution. [i]ntentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause (...) widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.
This wording mirrors that of arts 35(3) and 55 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I. Unfortunately, the three terms "widespread, long-term and severe" are also undefined in the ICC Statute. Nevertheless, art 8(2)(b)(iv) may be considered as a step forward in criminalising negative actions against the environment at the international level. This is because pre-existing laws were discretionary, 96 only encouraging states to criminalise environmental destruction actions under their national legal system and to require extradition or prosecution of individual perpetrators in cases of grave breaches.
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Neither does it appear that art 8(2)(b)(iv) requires actual damage to the environment or direct harm to take place. According to authoritative com- 92 Incendiary weapons are "designed to inflict damage on the enemy, his positions, or his environment primarily through the action of heat and flame. Besides these incendiary effects some incendiary agents are poisonous and some produce toxic or asphyxiating effects when burning. Incendiary weapons may be used as air weapons in the form of fire-bombs, in the form of grenades, small rockets, mortar ammunition and artillery projectiles. Other types of ground incendiary weapons include flamethrowers and emplaced devices such as landmines and flame fougasses. The main categories of agents used are oilbased incendiaries (napalm), metal incendiaries (magnesium), pyrotechnical incendiaries (thermite) and pyrophoric incendiaries (white phosphorus)". 95 ICC Statute, above n 93, art 8(2)(b)(iv). 96 Lawrence and Heller, above n 37, at 69-70. 97 Article 146 of the Geneva IV Convention requires state parties to pass domestic legislation in order to prosecute those who commit or order action amounting to such proscribed actions and to prosecute such offenders before their courts regardless of their nationality. Fourth Geneva Convention, above n 33, art 146. mentary on the ICC Statute, the mere action of launching a potentially devastating attack would bring this provision into play. 98 Article 8(2)(b)(iv) has even been considered -perhaps somewhat ambitiously -to be "eco-centric" because there is no need to establish that direct harm to humans has occurred in order to trigger this provision.
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Besides specific protection of the environment under art 8(2)(b)(iv), there are other provisions of the ICC Statute that address environmental harm, albeit incidentally. 100 These provisions protect the environment as a support for human life and not purely because of the intrinsic value of the environment itself.
101 Despite this, the end effect of these provisions is undeniably protecting the environment which makes it important for them to be identified.They are: art 8(2)(a)(iv) (prohibiting extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military necessity and carried out wantonly and unlawfully); art 8(2)(b)(ii) (prohibiting the intentional directing of attacks against civilian objects which are not military objectives);art 8(2)(b)(xvii) (prohibiting the use of poison and poisoned weapons); and art 8(2)(b)(xviii) (prohibiting the employment of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases).
B.customary law
In addition to treaty rules, the environment is also protected during times of war by customary international laws of war.
102
Recognition of customary law within IHL is crucial because of the possibility that belligerent states are not party to relevant treaty laws. Customary law normally binds all states that have not persistently objected to its development 103 and violation of the rules ofcustomary law is recognised as having legal consequences for the states responsible.
104
Thus, both sides of an armed conflictwill be bound by customary law, without exception.
This section tries to identifyrelevant customary rules and discusses how they may offer protection to the environment during wartime based on current state practice and literature. 105 For the purpose of clarity, the exami- 102 Tarasofsky, above n 17, at 22; Koppe, above n 9, at 204.As Schmitt observes: "Custom is at the core of the ius in bello. Indeed, as a source of the law of war it predates any of the applicable treaty law currently in force", above n 22, at 51. 103 Cassese, above n 7, at 157. 104 According to the International Law Commission (ILC), a breach of an international obligation is "when the act in question is not in conformity with what is required by that obligation 'regardless of its origin'. (...) They apply to all international obligations of states, whatever their origin may be. International obligations may be established by a customary rule of international law, by a treaty or by a general principle applicable within the international legal order". Commentary to draft art 12, paragraph 3, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts and Commentaries.Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of its Fifty-third session A/56/10 (2001) at [126] . 105 In order to attain customary status, a rule must first be amount to general practice, which ation of these rules may be divided into two categories: first,environmental protection under general customary rules within the principles of the law of war; and second, provisions from treaties in the law of war considered above, which have attained the status of customary law. Environmental protection from the customary principles of the law of war occursindirectly (if at all) via protection of people and property. There is no recognised text that defines all the customary principles of law of war.
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However, two central foundations of the law of warare undisputed. These are: first, that the only legitimate object that states may endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy; and second, thatthe choice of means and methods of warfare by belligerents is not unlimited.
108
Following on from these two propositions are four principles which become the parameters of permissible actions during hostilities by belligerents. They are the principles of necessity, humanity, proportionality and discrimination 109 and each of these principles:
110 strongly points to the conclusion that actions resulting in massive environmental destruction, especially where they do not serve a clear and important military purpose, would be questionable on many grounds, even in the absence of specific rules of war addressing environmental matters in detail. When the four principles are taken together, such a conclusion would seem inescapable.
The principle of neutrality may also protect the environment of neutral parties from potential cross-border damage during armed conflicts.
is usually a self-evident situation, and states must regard this general practice as a legal obligation. If a state violates such customary rule, there will be legal consequences for violation of this rule. The first requirement is commonly considered as an objective or material condition while the second requirement is considered to be a subjective or psychological condition or opinioniurissivenecessitatis. Anthony AustHandbook of International Law (2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010) at 6-8; North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark / the Netherlands) (Merit) [1969] he environment may receive protection during times of war through the distinction of military objectives from civilian objects. 121 For example, military attacks on environmentally important areas such as national parks and productive forest would be contrary to this principle and, subsequently, to art 52(2). 122 2.2.1.3.Principle of Humanity The principle of humanity requires that any weapons and tactics employed in warfare not cause superfluous suffering to victims by way of "prolonged or painful death" orby being in a"form calculated to cause severe fright or terror".
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Weapons and tactics, which might result in these outcomes, are illegal per se. For example, the poisoning of water supplies and the destruction of agricultural land and timber resources that are vital to the population could be considered "inhumane" means of warfare. 124 In other words, these acts are intuitively recognised as inherently wrongful or violate the "dictate of public conscience".
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In IHL, the requirement to conform to the "dictate of public conscience" is derived from the so-called "Martens Clause"
126 which also refers to the "laws of humanity". 127 This clause aimed to anticipate and prevent a pessimistic interpretation of the law of war arising, providing that anything not expressly prohibited was permitted. It has two fundamental functions: "to preserve the existing body of customary law not yet codified and to allow for its continuous development". 128 In terms of environmental protection, increased global environmental awareness means that a state's actions during times of war will be assessed in the court of public conscience.
129
Many scholars support the idea that environmental protection or consideration is included within the principles referred to in the Martens Clause. 130 ntil a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages established between civilised nations, from the laws of humanity and the requirements of the public conscience". "there was a shared view that the application and development of the law of armed conflict have to take into account the evolution of environmental concerns generally. The customary laws of war, in reflecting the dictates of public conscience, now include a requirement to avoid unnecessary damage to the environment". Chairman's Conclusions, 1991 Ottawa Conference on the Use of the Environment as a Tool of Conventional Warfare, paragraph 9. Quoted in Tarasofsky, above n 17, at 35. 131 Low and Hodgkinson, above n 15, at 445. 132 The recommendation provides that: "[u]ntil a more complete international code of environmental protection has been adopted, in cases not covered by international agreements and regulations, the biosphere and all its constituent elements and processes remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from dictates of the public conscience, and from the principles and fundamental values of humanity acting as steward for present and future genera- 138 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization or NATO is an intergovernmental military alliance based on the North Atlantic Treaty, which was signed on 4 April 1949, and it constitutes a collective defence system of mutual defence in response to any attack by external party. In 1999, NATO's members were Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, his principle in its decisions determining targets by taking into account "all possible 'collateral damage', be it environmental, human, or to civilian infrastructure".
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In examining the damage caused by NATO's subsequent bombing, the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign against the formerFederal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) stated that the impacts were "best considered from the underlying principles of the law of armed conflict such as necessity and proportionality".
140 Finally, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) hasconfirmed in its Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons that:
141
[s]tates must take environmental considerations into account when assessing what is necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military objectives. Respect for the environment is one of the elements that go to assessing whether an action is in conformity with the principles of necessity and proportionality.
2.2.1.5.Principle of Neutrality According to the principle of neutrality, the environment of neutral and non-participating countries should be protected during armed conflicts.
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This applies to trans-boundary and environmental damage. In an armed conflict, a state is considered to be neutral if it declares its neutrality and acts in a neutral manner towards all belligerents. 146 This declaration and action of neutrality will protect the population and environment of the neutral state against any attack by the belligerents. 147 Violations will be The environmental protection afforded by this principle is favourable because the principle is enforced by non-belligerents correcting violationsof their sovereignty, including their environment. Under the law of neutrality, anytreaty relationships existingbetween belligerents and neutral states remain applicable during hostilities. 150 Thus, belligerents must continueto perform all their treaty obligations, particularly towards neutral states.
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In addition, declaration or action of neutrality will protect the population and environment of the neutral state against any attack from the belligerents. This inviolability includes trans-boundary damage and, in particular, environmental damage. Violations of this protection will be regarded as an act of aggression and entail international responsibility. 2.Customary Status of Treaty Provisions As stated above, there exist some obligations which stem from treaty law but have also attained customary status that may protect the environment during times of war. These obligations may arise under treaty provisions that are declaratory of pre-existing norms of customary international law, or such provisions may have developed into customary international law.
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Either way, they bind belligerent states that do not subscribe to the particular treaty in question.
For example, the environmental protection provisions from the 1907 Hague Regulations, the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, the1949 Geneva IV Convention, and ENMOD 154 have been acknowledged as part of customary international law that potentially bind all states as examined below.
The 162 This level of acceptance even outstripsstate acceptance of the UN Charter with 193states. 163 Thus provisions in the Geneva Conventions, including those which protect the environment, have attained the status of customary international law. 164 Moreover, the ICJ has confirmed the customary status of these Conventions. 165 Drafters of ENMOD deemed it to be made up of continuing innovative rules. If true, this would limit the Convention's application to state parties only. Someof today's scholars, however, argue that ENMOD may become customary international law as reflected in state practice. 166 The two Review Conferences of the ENMOD Parties in 1984 and 1992 noted that there had been no violations, and no complaints or proposals to change the rules of the Convention. 167 Further, many states-both parties and non-parties-haveincorporated ENMOD's rules into their military manuals, providing evidence that these states consider these rules to be legal obligations. The UNGA also includes the Convention's rules in its Guidelines on the Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict, which it invites all states to disseminate. 168 At the Second ENMOD Review Conference the US stated that ENMOD mirrored "the international community's consensus that the environment itself should not be used as an instrument of war". 169 Finally, general and uniform practice from states reflects consensus on the prohibition of environmental destruction as a weapon in armed conflict.
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In addition to the two categories of customary rules already discussed, it is worth noting what one scholar, Koppe, considers a new direct customary rule protecting the environment during wartime that has been emerging since the 1970s. 171 The principle is rooted in a global concern for theenvironment in general that was recognised formally for the first time in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration 172 and has subsequently inspired innovations in the law of war that specifically protect the environment.
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These appear both as treaty provisionsand also as developments in customary international law. 174 Stemming from the principle of environmental protection or responsibility, Koppeargues that there are three emerging norms of customary international law that directly protect the environment during armed conflict. These norms are: a general customary duty of care for the environment; a prohibition on causing wanton or wilful damage to the environment that is not justified by military necessity; and a prohibition on causing excessive collateral damage to the environment. The first rule resultsfrom the development of international regulations protecting the environment in general and from repeated expressions of concern. The other twoare derived from numerous references to the principles of necessity, distinction and proportionality during international hostilities.
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These three emerging norms are legally significant because they bind all states, providing legal protection for the environment during international hostilities that is independent from written treaties, and because they derive both from general worldwide concern for the environment and from fundamental principles in the law of war, such as military necessity, distinction and proportionality in the context of environmental protection during wartime. 
iii.Peacetime obligations as additional legal Protection to the Environment during wartime
In the aftermath of the environmental catastrophe resulting from the 1991 Gulf War, there was widespread pressure from the international community to apply general international obligations from peacetime, such as international environmental law, to strengthen the law of war and ensure better protection for the environment during armed conflict. Schmitt, ontended that the existing laws of war were inadequate. 178 Aside from the international environmental regime, some also considered thatother peacetime obligations from other branches of international law, such as international human rights law 179 and international law on the use of force (ius ad bellum), were relevant. 180 The proposition that certain peacetime obligations that protect the environment can continue during times of war is valid. However, this does not mean that the protections offered by the existing laws of war are inadequate: as the previous section has shown, the laws of war contain a significant number of provisions, sourced both from treaties and customary laws, that protect the environment both in general and specific ways. The applicationof peacetime obligations simply providesan additional layer of legal protection for the environment during armed conflict.
In general, the notion of continuityof peacetime obligations in times of armed conflict has been subject to debate for some time. While it is widely acknowledged that this debate is on-goingand many studies have tried to resolve this issue, 181 there is a general consensus that the outbreak of armed conflict does not automatically terminate peacetime treaties as discussed below.
A.Applicability of Peacetime Obligations during Armed Conflicts
Before identifying relevant peacetime obligations that protect the en- vironment during armed conflict, it is important to examine both the treaty relationship between belligerents and non-belligerents, and thatbetween belligerents. These relationships are different to one another, and may determine whether or not they are still bound by peacetime obligations during the war.
In times of armed conflict, there is always a possibility that the territory of a third state, in particular a neighbouring state, will be affected. In this situation, the law of neutrality, discussed above, 182 governs the relationship between belligerents and neutral states 183 and, accordingly, peacetime treaties remain applicable between them (including their means of enforcement). 184 Further, the obligation not to affect the territory of neutral states under the law of neutrality is in line with customary environmental law, which prevents states from damaging another state's environment during peacetime.
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In contrast, the application of peacetime treaties between belligerents may be severely affected during wartime. 186 However, the following analysis reveals that there are treaties which continue to apply to protect the environment of belligerent states during armed conflict.
The law of war is traditionally considered by some states and commentators to be a special branch of law that applies exclusively in times of war, superseding any peacetime treaties. 187 Early writers contend that the outbreak of war automatically annuls pre-existing treaties between belligerents.
188 However, the current practiceof states 189 and international organisations 190 has dissolved the traditional dichotomy between the law of war and the law of peace. 184 Simonds, above n 56, at 188; Koppe, above n 9, at 269.Tarasofsky argued that, to the extent that the laws of neutrality permit, a state of peace exists between neutral and belligerents. Tarasofsky, above n 17, at 32.In an armed conflict, a state is considered to be neutral if it declares its neutrality and acts in a neutral manner to all belligerents. This declaration or action of neutrality will protect the population and environment of the neutral state against any attack from the belligerents. This inviolability includes transboundary damage and, in particular, environmental damage. Violations of this protection will be regarded as an act of aggression and entail international responsibility. Roberts, above n 147 at 118; Plant, above n 143, at 164; Al-Duaij, above n 61, 108. 185 Tarasofsky, above n 17, at 31. 186 Koppe, above n 9, at 336. 187 Vöneky, above n 178, at 25. 192 Even though this Convention is inconclusive in this matter, it does not mean that it is irrelevant. The Convention provides that the peremptory norms of general international law, or iuscogens, remain valid at all times. 193 It also recognises rights of states to terminate or suspend a treaties under the rules on supervening impossibility of performance and fundamental change of circumstances, or rebus sic stantibus. 194 However, based on the overall practice of the international community, it is now suggested that war does not negate all legal relations between states, and that war itself is not a phenomenon outside the realm of law. 195 Instead, there are three possible effects of war on peacetime treaties: they may be terminated; suspended; or remain valid during armed conflict. Particularly, for the purpose of this thesis, it may be highlighted that there is a wide acceptance -even near unanimity -among scholars that the event of armed conflict does not automatically terminate all pre-existing treaties between warring parties. 196 Thus, the claim that the law of war is a lexspecialis (special law), which exclusively applies during armed conflict, is today questionable 197 and artificial.
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In addition, most studies (including the most recent study conducted by the International Law Commission (ILC) in 2011) suggest that whether or not a treaty remains valid in part or whole will be determined mainly by the intention of the parties and the object and purpose of the treaty. 199 These two elements are not wholly independent of one another. If the parties' intend the treaty to apply during armed conflict, expressly stating this, it is logical to assume that the object and purpose of the treaty will be compatible with the situation of armed conflict. Similarly, if the treaty does not clearly express the intention of the parties, then an object or purpose compatible with the situation of armed conflict may suffice for it to remain valid during this time.
Consequently, scholars have identified that there are a number of peace-time treaty categories that remain applicable during hostilities between warring parties. From these categories, some treaties from human rights law and environmental laware relevant to this thesis because they could strengthen the law of war to protect the environment during armed conflict.
In addition to these two sources of law (human rights and environmental law treaties), there is a special peacetime regime which may be argued to offer indirect but significant protection for the environment in times of war -international law on the use of force (ius ad bellum). This is due to the application of ius ad bellumlaw during the 1991 Gulf War 203 in the formof the UN Security Council's (UNSC) Resolution 687.
204
Identification and examination of environmental protection provisions from human rights law, environmental law and ius ad bellum will be provided in the following sections.
B.International Human Rights Law
In principle, international human rights treaties remain valid in times both of peace and armed conflict, 205 particularly "non-derogable" provisions 200 Vöneky notes that this category of treaties continues to apply during wartime because such treaties "establish a territorial order in the general interest of the international community, such as treaties providing for the demilitarisation or neutralisation of zones or the internationalisation of waterways". Vöneky, above n 178, at 23. 201 According to McNair, multilateral law-making treaties are those that "create rules of international law for regulating the future conduct of the parties without creating an international regime, status, or system. It is believed that these treaties survive a war, whether all the contracting parties or only some of them are belligerent". McNair, above n 197, at 723.
202 See McNair, above n 197, at 703-723; the 1985 IDI Resolution, above n 197, arts 4-6; Delbrück, above n 182, at 1370; the 2005 UN Secretariat Study, above n 197, at 14-40; the 2011 ILC Draft, above n 197, draft art 7 and annex. 203 According to Low and Hodgkinson, "[t] he prohibition against the use of force in article 2(4) is capable of protecting any object, including the environment, which might be affected by the unlawful use of force. Article 2(4) is aimed at the protection of the 'territorial integrity or political independence of any state.' In other words, it protects state sovereignty which extends to protection of a state's people, property, and environment", above n 15, at 459. 204 Resolution 687 reaffirmed that: "Iraq, without prejudice to the debts and obligations of Iraq arising prior to 2 August 1990, which will be addressed through the normal mechanisms, is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait" (emphasis added). f some treaties. 206 The application of human rights law during armed conflict creates an interesting relationship between human rights law and international humanitarian law or the law of war. 207 In addition, human rights treaties are considered to be applicable during wartime because their main object is "the protection of a common good in the interest of the state community as a whole", which is comparable to treaties establishing objective regimes. 208 The right to a healthy environment has been an important subject in human rights law. 209 This is based on the proposition that environmental protection is an indispensable element of, and a pre-requisite to, the enjoyment of human rights. 210 Furthermore, the close relationship between environmental protection and human rights has been the subject of much academic discussion. 211 States in general have recognised this relationship through paragraph 1 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment.
It affirms that:

212
[m]an has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations.
Two decades later, international protection for the environment was again closely linked with human rights 213 in Principle 1 of the Rio Declaration which reads: "[h]uman beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development. They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature".
214
Following the Rio Declaration, the UN Commission on Human Rights conducted a study of human rights and the environment in 1994. Its final 'Ksentini Report' examined the relationship between human rights and the environment and provided draft principles for legal framework of this relationship. The importance of the close relationship between human rights and the environment is expressly stated in Part 1: "[h]uman rights, an ecologically sound environment, sustainable development and peace are interdependent and indivisible". 215 Within treaty law, explicit reference of environmental protection can be found in Article 12 of the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). It recognises the "right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health" including the right to "the improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene". 216 Apart from this provision, there is no independent right to a sound environment in international law. 217 However, some scholars argue that environmental rights can be derived from other existing treaties especially the rights to life, private life, property and access to justice 218 under the 1966 international covenant on civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 219 [n]ot only in peacetime but also in times of armed conflict, the deliberate causing of large-scale environmental damage which severely affects the health of a considerable proportion of the population concerned, or creates risks for the health of future generations, amounts to a serious violation of (…) article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
In addition, one of the draft principles of the Ksentini Report above particularly stressed the importance of compliance with international humanitarian law in order to protect human rights and the environment.
223
It stipulated: 224 [s]tates and all other parties shall avoid using the environment as a means of war or inflicting significant, long-term or widespread harm on the environment, and shall respect international law providing protection for the environment in times of armed conflict and cooperate in its further development.
Based on this analysis, most provisions from human rights treaties remain applicable during wartime including those that provide protection to the environment. Therefore, belligerent states should ensure that they respect not only the protection of (narrowly conceived) human rights but also to the environment under the regime of human rights law.
C.International Environmental Law
While most environmental treaties are silent on their wartime applicability, and may contain clauses to preclude their application to ships or aircraft entitled to sovereign immunity, 225 the general application of international environmental treaties during armed conflict between belligerents has received growing support from the international community. 226 As discussed below, this proposition is based on the fact that the object and purpose of some environmental treaties is compatible and consistent with the event of armed conflict and thus termination or suspension of their implementation is irrelevant during wartime.
Apart from the effect of war on treaties in general, some scholars havefocused their discussion onthe question of whether, and to what extent, peacetime environmental treaties continue to apply during armed conflict.
227
Among these scholars, Vöneky has presented a convincing argument concerning the applicability of environmental treaties during armed con-flict. By analogous application, 228 Vöneky argues that at least two categories of environmental treaty remain valid for the belligerents. These are environmental treatiesprotecting areas beyond national jurisdiction 229 and "common goods", 230 which aim to serve the interests of the state community as a whole,without any direct advantage to a particular state. 231 Vöneky asserts that they are similar or comparable to treaties creating a permanent regime or status and treaties protecting fundamental human rights respectively, 232 and thus continue to apply and bind the belligerents during armed conflict.It is considered that this approach is sound in theory and also has the advantage that using these categories to identify environmental treaties, which remain applicable in wartime, simplifies and clarifies the process, making it easier to invoke them on belligerents during wartime.
In addition to Vöneky's approach, it may also be argued that despite the parties not intending to be bound during times or war, these environmental provisions remain valid because their object and purpose are compatible with the event of armed conflict. Most of these treaties are multilateral treaties with governing issues or objects that do not have benefit to a particular state or states but are for the international community as a whole. Accordingly, international cooperation to achieve common goals becomes the primary objective even during times of armed conflict. Therefore, they remain applicable and bind state belligerents during armed hostilities.
It may be not self-evident that violations of these treaties above will affect other states directly. Nevertheless, since they serve the interests of the state community as a whole, statesthat were not directly affected could invoke provisions against states that violate the relevant treaties. For such situation, international law provides that these non-specifically affected states may invoke clauses if the violation affects a group of states including that state, or if the "obligation breached is owed to the international community as a whole".
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Further, the international tribunal has confirmed the possibility of such invocation of responsibility recently. The Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) states that, in the case of damage, each state party may claim "compensation in light of the ergaomnescharacter of the obligations relating to preservation of the environment of the high seas and in the Area". 234 In addition, the Chamber also suggests that the International Seabed Authority may be entitled to claim similar compensation because it acts "on behalf of mankind". 229 These treaties cover areas such as the deep seabed, the high seas and the Antarctic. 230 These "goods" include the climate, the ozone layer, biodiversity, world heritage sites, wild and endangered species, and wetlands with international importance. 231 Vöneky, above n 178, at 21. 232 Examination of these treaties revealsthat they were established in the general interest of the international community as a whole and are accordinglyhighly likely to continue to apply in the event of armed conflict.
In protecting areas beyond national jurisdiction, UNCLOS covers areas such as the seabed (the Area) and the high seas in the provisions in Parts XI and XII respectively. Furthermore, these provisions contain no indicationthat the parties did not intend them to apply in wartime.
Part XI of UNCLOS protects the Area from military activities in the common interest. Article 136 states that the Area and its resources are the "common heritage of mankind".
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The clear purpose of these provisions is to protect the seabed in the interests of present and future generations of people. Subsequent provisions confirm this position by prohibiting states from making claims or exercising sovereignty or "sovereign rights" over the Area or its resources, by determining that "[a]ll rights in the resources of the area are vested in mankind as a whole" 239 and by requiring that activities in theArea be conducted for "the benefit of mankind as a whole".
240 At the institutional level, UNCLOS confers on the International Seabed Authority the right to manage resources of the areas in which the interests of mankind as In addition, art 141 offers environmental protection by restricting activities in the Area to those done exclusively for "peaceful purposes".
241
UNCLOS does not contain a specific definition of "peaceful purposes". However, the meaning of this phrase may be extrapolated from arts 88 and 301. Article 88 states that "[t]he high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes" 242 and art 301 narrowly states:
243
[i]n exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention, state parties shall refrain from any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of United Nations.
From these provisions, it can be understood that the protection provided by art 141 is not against all military activity, but has to be interpreted as 238 The 1982 UNCLOS, above n 237, art 136. 239 Ibid, art 137(1) and (2). 240 Ibid, art 140(1). 241 It is stated: "[t]he Area shall be open to use exclusively for peaceful purposes by all states, whether coastal or land-locked, without discrimination and without prejudice to the other provisions of this Part". Ibid, art 141. 242 Ibid, art 88. According to UNEP, this provision seems to proscribe any hostile activities, such as those which are military in nature, without specifying the extent of harm to the environment of the high seas as areas beyond national jurisdiction.UNEP 2009, above n 109, at 36. 243 The 1982 UNCLOS, above n 237, art 301.
a prohibition of aggressive activities in light of the meaning of the UN Charter (see art 2(4)). It is apparent that aggressive military activities that might lead to an armed conflict in the Area may be contrary to the interest of the international community as a whole. The possibility of this situation implicitly shows that these provisions are compatible with, and remain valid, in the event of armed conflict.
Besides the Area, provisions to protect the environment in the interests of the international community as a whole are also provided in Part XII. Here, states have the obligation, under art 192, "to protect and preserve the marine environment". 244 This article obliges all states to protect the marine environment per sebecause it does not refer to national interests or parties. Thus, this provision arguably represents an obligation that serves the interest of the international community as a whole. 245 Since art 192 protects the environment in the common interest, Vöneky argued that any article that may serve national interests, such as art 194 (2), 246 should be interpreted in the light of art 192's general rule as a means to protecting the marine environment in the general interest.
247
In addition to marine protection beyond national jurisdiction, states are also under obligations to conserve sustainable fisheries and marine life conservation in the area of high seas.
248 Under these rules, party statesare obliged to control fishing within their territories in order to maintain sustainable levels of fish stocks in their waters or in the regional waters surrounding their territories. It is difficult to see how state parties could justifiably argue that their obligations or indeed UNCLOS' duties in relation to high seas are incompatible with a state of war.
It seems that art 236, which provides an exemption clause for military devices, 249 renders UNCLOS provisions inapplicable during armed conflict. Sucha challenge may, however, be laid to rest by reference to the rest of that provision, which requires each state to "ensure (…) that such vessels or aircraft act in a manner consistent, so far as is reasonable and practicable, with this Convention". 250 Therefore, it can be argued that environmental damage from the conduct of aircraft and warships during armed conflict is not wholly exempted by art 236 because the member states remain obliged to make sure that such vessels or aircrafts act according to UNCLOS.
It therefore seems that the provisions in UNCLOS for the protection of the Area and the marine environment aim to serve the interests of the international community as a whole. Given the absence of any indication that the 244 Ibid, art 192. 245 In commenting on this article, Kiss and Shelton argued that "the general interest of all mankind is recognised in this way, which is higher than the interests and the sovereignty of individual states and independent of any harm or damage which may be suffered as a result of the activities of other states". Alexandre Kiss and Dinah Shelton "Systems Analysis of International Law: A Methodological Inquiry" (1986) 68 NYIL 45 at 64; see also Vöneky, above n 178, at 26. 246 Article 194(2) stipulates "[s]tates shall take all measures necessary to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to other states and their environment, (…)". The 1982 UNCLOS, above n 237. 247 Vöneky, above n 178, at 26. 248 The 1982 UNCLOS, above n 237, arts 117-120. 249 Article 236 provides that: "the provisions of this convention regarding the protection and preservation of the marine environment do not apply to any warship". Ibid, art 236. 250 Ibid.
arties did not intend these provisions to apply in times of war, it can be argued that these provisions remain valid during armed conflicts and are binding on belligerent states.
Another importantexample of an environmental treaty that serves the interests of the international community is the Antarctic Treaty. Its preamble confirms that: "it is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international discord". In addition, art XIII paragraph 1 stipulates that theTreaty "shall be open for accession by any state which is a member of the United Nations, or by any other state…". 253 Further, the Consultative Parties emphasised their responsibility to protect the Antarctic area against any activitythat might have consequences of global significance.
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In 1991, the Consultative Parties further agreed to designate Antarctica as a special protected area devoted only to peace and science. 255 From such references, it is clear that the Antarctic Treaty protects the Antarctic area in the interests of the international community. 256 The permanent special status designation of the Antarctic has shown states' intention to protect certain areas beyond national jurisdiction without any time limitation. Thus, it is similar to a treaty establishing a permanent regime or status, 257 and so continues to bindbelligerents during armed conflict.
2.Treaties Protecting Common Goods
As discussed previously, 258 human rights treaties remain valid 251 The 1959 Antarctic Treaty, above n 238, preamble. 252 Ibid, art I. 253 Ibid, art XIII(1). 254 Catherine Redgwell "The Protection of the Antarctic Environment and the Ecosystem Approach" in Michael Bowman and Catherine Redgwell (eds) International Law and the Conservation of Biological Diversity (Kluwer Law International, London, 1996) 109 at 113. 255 This is stipulated in a protocol to the Antarctic Treaty with commonly known as the Madrid Protocol. Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty(opened for signature 4 October 1991, entered into force 14 January 1998). 256 Having established this legal position, Vöneky also argues that other treaties within the Antarctic Treaty System also serve the interest of the international community as a whole, such as the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, the Convention on the Regulation of the Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities and the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty. Vöneky, above n 178, at 27, fn 83. 257 As noted previously, treaties creating a permanent regime or special status such as administration of a territory, establishing a boundary, and creating an international organisation will be unaffected during wartime among its member parties. Together with the Ramsar Convention, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) argues that it may be easier to apply these two particular Conventions during armed conflicts than other agreements from environmental law because they provide "real guidance to commanders on the battlefield or to be enforced after the event".
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Finally, since the objects of all the treaties in this section are problems common to all membersof the international community, it can be considered that inter-state cooperation (to achieve common goals) is a primary objective even during times of war. Therefore, it can be argued that the implementation of these rules and principlesdoes not cease in the event of armed conflict. Further, as treaties that serve the interest of the international community in general, in a similar way to human rights treaties, they continue to apply to bind belligerent states during times of armed conflict. Following human rights and environmental laws, ius ad bellum (the law on the use of force) is the third category of general international peacetime law that offers environmental protection during armed conflict. In the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, the UNSC held Iraq liable for war consequences including environmental damage, mainly because of Iraq's violation of ius ad bellum. 282 Even though environmental protection under this regime may be both subsidiary and indirect, 283 this attribution of wrongdoing should be welcomed for its potential precedent-setting value.
Ius ad bellumcomprises a body of international law that governs the resort to armed force as an instrument of national policy. 284 In modern times, art 2(4) of the UN Charter 285 has become the source of this law which is also considered to be iuscogens. 286 Resort to armed force is however permissible when it is conducted in self-defence under art 51, 287 or if the collective action of military force is authorised by the UNSC under Chapter VII of the UN Char-er. 288 It is well established by customary international law that resort to the use of armed force in self-defence must be both proportional and necessary. 289 Any resort to armed force by states, whether lawful or not, is highly likely to lead to international hostilities. Legal obligations under ius ad bellum are considered to be peacetime obligations because they regulate states' decisions to resort to armed force in times of peace. It is accepted that ius ad bellum and ius in bello are two different branches of law that invoke distinct responsibilities. 290 However, the application of both of these rules to the events of the 1991 Gulf War presents an interesting and important relationship between when these rules will be considered to have been breached and the legal consequences of such a breach. This is because a belligerent may be held responsible based on its violation of the rules of ius ad bellumfor the consequences of war, including illegal conduct during armed conflict.
In 1991, Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait was determined to be a violation of ius ad bellum. UNSC Resolution 687 affirmed that:
Iraq, (...), is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations as a result of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. 291 Further, in order for a claim arising out of these events to be accepted and reviewed by the UNSC, the claim"must be the result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait" and "the causal link must be direct". 292 One example of when the causal link will be sufficiently "direct" is where the loss has resulted from "military operations or threat of military action by either side during the period of 2 August 1990 to 2 March 1991". 293 The word "during" suggests that the main concern is about wartime conduct and not the prewar period when Iraq decided to use force (which is subject to ius ad bellum). The UNSC's approach means that Iraq was held responsible for its illegal conducts during the war based on a violation of ius ad bellum and not ius in bello.
This event has blurredthe distinction of legal responsibility from two branches of law, ius ad bellum and ius in bello. This is due to the fact that Iraq was determined to be the "aggressor" that violated the law on the use of force by unlawfully initiating war;and was consequently found liable for all damage during the war. 294 This event has also triggered a challenge to theprinciple of equal ap- 288 Ibid, arts 42-47. 289 In the Nicaragua Case, the ICJ states: "[s]elf-defence would warrant only measures which are proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it, a rule well established in customary international law". Nicaragua Case, above n 166, at 94. This confirmation was repeated again by the Court in the 1996. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, above n 141, at 245. 290 Koppe, above n 9, at 317.Ius ad bellum applies in peacetime and concerns only a state's decision to resort to armed force against another state. If such decision is deemed unlawful under ius ad bellum then the concerned state is responsible for that violation of law. Meanwhile, ius in bello applies in wartime and concerns only a state's military conduct in active armed conflict. If there are violations of any rules of the law of war (ius in bello) then the concerned state is held responsible. 291 plication (or treatment) 295 of ius in belloin times of war.It seems that,as opposed to equal treatment, in the event of war initiated by violation of ius ad bellum, the application of ius in bellowill turn against the aggressor. This is based on anargument that military activities, such as killing people and destroying property, are originally criminal in nature unless justified by legitimate reasons. In addition, challenges to equal treatment under ius in belloare also based on the maxim of ex iniuriaius non oritur that an entity cannot benefit from rights that result from illegal activities.
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Indeed, in 1963, the Institut de Droit International or Institute of International Law conducted a thorough study on this issue and accepted unequal treatment of belligerentsin cases where the UNSC "has labelled one of the parties as 'aggressor'" or in cases of "collective action by UN forces based on a decision of the [UNSC]". 297 This discriminatory application of ius in bello may have an effect on an aggressor's rights and obligations in times of war, particularly in regards to the continuation of peacetime treaties. The international community accepts that an aggressor state does not have the right to terminate, withdraw from or suspend all peacetime (environmental)obligations for its own benefit as a result of armed conflict.
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Consequently, this guarantees that an aggressor state will always continue to be bound by any Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) they subscribed to during peacetime.
Allocation of state liability for war damage according to its position of unlawful conduct under ius ad bellum has some precedent in the aftermath of World War I 299 and World War II. 300 In addition, the idea of holding aggressors liable for war damage in general is supported by many experts. 301 To some 295 This principle means that belligerents are treated equally without prejudice of whether their resort to armed force under ius ad bellum is lawful or not. See the Four 1949 Geneva Conventions, above n 34, art 1; The 1977 Additional Protocol I, above n 45, Preamble, paragraph 5. 296 Dinstein, above n 288, at 156-157. 297 Koppe, above n 9, at 320. 298 The 1985 IDI Resolution, above n 197, art 9. It reads: "[a] state committing aggression within the meaning of the Charter of the United Nations and Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of the General Assembly of the United Nations shall not terminate or suspend the operation of a treaty if the effect would be to benefit that state". See also Draft Article 15, The 2011 ILC Draft Articles, above n 197, which reads: "[a] state committing aggression within the meaning of the Charter of the United Nations and resolution 3314 (XXIX) of the General Assembly of the United Nations shall not terminate or withdraw from a treaty or suspend its operation as a consequence of an armed conflict that results from the act of aggression if the effect would be to the benefit of that state". 299 In the Treaty of Versailles, Germany accepted responsibility: "for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies". Germany also agreed to: "make compensation for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allied and Associated Powers and to their property during the period of belligerency of and as an Allied or Associated Power against Germany, by such aggression by land, by sea, and in general by all damage as defined in Annex 1 hereto". egree, certain of these experts have been influenced by the experience in the 1991 Gulf War. They are Low and Hodgkinson in 1995, 302 Boelaert-Suominen in 1996, 303 Greenwood in 1996, 304 Gattini in 2002, 305 and Ronen in 2008.
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In terms of compensation for environmental damage as a consequence of violations to the rules ofius ad bellum, the experience of the 1991 Gulf War has become a landmark case, leading to the first instance of compensation being consideredavailable for environmental damage arising as a result of a state's unlawful conduct of aggression. 307 bellum may be held responsible for all damage, including environmental damage, caused by the war, regardless of whether there was any violation of ius in bello. 311 This resolution also shows that ius ad bellum, hitherto usually considered as part of international law's peacetime obligations, has significant potential for addressing environmental damage related to armed conflict.
Further, in terms of future development, the fact that the UNSC held the aggressor state in the 1991 Gulf War responsible in this manner likely indicates thatthe UNSC will act similarly in subsequent cases.
312 Such a precedent has been considered to provide significant deterrent effects. 313 In addition, protection proffered by ius ad bellummay become a safety net which could overcome some deficiencies in the protection of the environment under ius in bello. 
iv. conclusion
As far as environmental protection during armed conflict is concerned, IHL provides significant direct and indirect legal protection, which comes from treaty and customary laws. Given the wide array and significant number of existingrules that protect the environment within IHL, it is perhaps less important to have a new, specific international agreement focusing on environmental protection during times of war.
The development of environmental protection within the law of war may be broadly divided into two time-periods: before and after the 1970s. Widespread concern over the global environment in general only began in earnest in the 1970s. Such growing concern also applied in the area of armed conflict. It has been noted that the word "environment" does not occur in any IHL treaty prior to 1977. However, this does not mean the environment was not protected during times of war, but rather that such protection was found in different forms and contexts. Prior to 1977, protection of the environment was afforded in more general statements of principle, 315 and was often incidental to human protection. 316 After 1977, in contrast, provisions in IHL were adopted which specifically or expressly protected the environment.
In addition, protection of the environment proffered by the law of war may be strengthened by the fact that there are also relevant international peacetime rules which protect the environment and remain valid during times of war. With the identification of such rules, it may be submitted that the environment is afforded an additional layer of legal protection during armed conflict. Therefore, belligerent states no longer have any leeway to escape their duty of taking into account environmental factors when conducting military operations.
Generally, the applicability of peacetime treaty provisions during wartime is based on the widely acknowledged principle that the event of armed conflict does not ipso facto suspend or terminate the pre-existing 311 Low and Hodgkinson, above n 15, at 456, 312 Greenwood, above n 176, at 407; Low and Hodgkinson, ibid, at 477-479; Bunker, above n 5, at 209. 313 Greenwood, ibid, at 412. 314 Koppe, above n 9, at 333. 315 Roberts, above n 110, at 229. 316 Stone, above n 61, at 21. reaties. 317 Some categories of treaties have been argued to remain applicable between belligerents during times of war. These are treaties whose objects are largely unaffected by the advent of war between parties to the agreements and/or which the parties intended to continue during such periods. Of these categories, environmental protection during wartime may be found in two branches of law: international human rights law and international environmental law. In addition to these two fields of law, rules from ius ad bellum(or the law on the use of force) also provide significant protection from environmental harm during times of war, despite their primary applicability during peacetime. Identification of relevant rules from these laws has shown that peacetime obligations provide additional layers of protection for the environment during war.
Provisions from international human rights law are considered valid both during peacetime and wartime. This is because the object of these laws is to enforce basic universal human protections, which is also the main goal of the law of war in general. Specific environmental protection is found in the general acknowledgement of international declarations 318 and reports of human rights commissioners.
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The most relevant provision from human rights law that offers explicit protection to the environment is art 12 of the ICESSome treaties within international environmental law potentially remain valid during wartime by way of analogous approach. An environmental treaty may continue to apply in times of armed conflict if it has the aim of serving the interests of the international community as a whole. In relation to this, it is proposed that two categories of environmental treaty remain valid during wartime and thus bind belligerent states: treaties protecting areas beyond national jurisdiction and treaties protecting "common goods".
The provisions of the law on the use of force, or ius ad bellum, also provide significant protection of the environment during wartime, albeit in an indirect way. Protection under this regime is provided by the fact that aggressor states are held accountable for paying compensation for war consequences, including environmental damage. This kind of compensation finds its precedent in previous cases of armed conflict, such as the World Wars and the 1991 Gulf War.
These peacetime obligations form an important group of legal norms which address environmental protection in relation to armed conflict. Even though these peacetime obligations do not regulate a state's conduct during armed conflict, "they reinforce civil liability and help define criminal responsibility under the laws of war".
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They also provide additional legal mechanisms for responsible belligerents to repair or compensate another state for any environmental damage resulting from their unlawful conduct. Further, these peacetime obligations could play a crucial role in filling the gaps in the general principles of law recognised by nations, in cases when international conventions and customary international law fail to address a particular problem. 321 Finally, it is important to emphasise that the environment is sufficiently 317 Indeed, subject to the law of neutrality, treaty relationships between belligerents and neutral states are largely unaffected and remain valid. See above at [2.2.1.5]. 318 The Stockholm Declaration, above n 173, at [1]; The Rio Declaration, above n 215, principle 1. 319 The 1994 Ksentini Report, above n 216, at 27-30, 74 (principles 1 and 23). 320 Sharp, above n 62, at 28. 321 Ibid. rotected by international law during international hostilities. It is a fact that there are significant numbers of international rules that protect the environment in a comprehensive manner during wartime which are sourced not only from wartime laws but also peacetime obligations that bind state belligerents. It is also important to understand that this means that any belligerent party that has caused environmental damage in an armed conflict should be held accountable for its unlawful conduct
